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Abstract 
Altruism is a central feature of human morality. Recent research sheds light on the 
development of altruism in early childhood. In this article, we propose a theoretical framework 
that systematizes research on how altruism develops from infancy to childhood. The framework 
includes four phases in the development of human altruism: 1) interest in social interactions, 2) 
preference for others’ goal completion, 3) concern with others’ well-being, and 4) a normative 
stance toward altruistic actions. We point to needs for additional research, especially on 
developmental processes by which children develop from one phase to another, eventually 
leading children to acquire forms of altruism that play important roles in human societies. 
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Altruistic acts are acts motivated by concerns to promote the welfare of others, not only 
as a means of attaining another outcome, but as an end in itself (Nagel, 1970; Oliner & Oliner, 
1988). Altruistic acts can be everyday acts of assisting or comforting others, as well as heroic 
efforts to save lives at great personal risk, like individuals helping Jews survive during World 
War II (Oliner & Oliner, 1988; Turiel, 2015). In some situations, people think altruistic acts are 
obligatory, for instance, saving someone’s life (Dahl, Gingo, Uttich, & Turiel, 2018; Miller, 
Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990; Turiel, 2015). In other situations, altruistic acts are considered 
superogatory: morally good but not required (Kahn, 1992; Killen & Turiel, 1998). The 
emergence of altruism in humans has puzzled researchers from a variety of disciplines, including 
philosophy, psychology, and biology. 
 To explain how altruism develops in humans, researchers have studied early forms of 
prosocial behaviors: helping, comforting, and sharing (see, e.g., Dahl, 2015; Dunfield & 
Kuhlmeier, 2013; Paulus, 2014; Roth-Hanania, Davidov, & Zahn-Waxler, 2011; Warneken, 
2015). This research speaks to fundamental questions about the origins of altruism: Are infants 
innately altruistic? If not, how do altruistic tendencies emerge? 
In this article, we propose a developmental framework for research on the development 
of altruism. We argue that a developed altruism, as seen in adults, is accompanied by an ability 
to normatively evaluate acts as obligatory or prohibited. Moreover, we propose that infants’ 
earliest prosocial behaviors, like instrumental helping, are not motivated by altruistic concerns 
for others’ welfare but by an interest in social interactions. Based on this definition and a review 
of recent research, we argue that altruism develops gradually, through four phases in early 
childhood. While much of the research we review has investigated instrumental and empathic 
responding, our framework applies to all forms of altruism. In delineating these four phases, we 
  
 
 
point to important, unanswered questions about the emergence of human altruism. 
 
Altruism from a Psychological Point of View 
In this article. we define and discuss altruism from a psychological point of view. By 
altruistic acts, we mean acts motivated by concerns for the welfare of others. We refer to welfare 
as a positive psychological or bodily state, not the accomplishment of goals per se (which may or 
may not lead to improved welfare). According to this account, the agent may be concerned with 
immediate welfare (as when comforting a person in distress) or with long-term welfare (as when 
a parent puts on a child’s seatbelt, sometimes to the child’s immediate dismay, to prevent the 
child from being harmed in an accident). This psychological definition of altruism differs from 
biological definitions of altruism, which refer to behaviors that increase the probability of the 
recipient’s survival while decreasing the probability of the agent’s survival (de Waal, 2008). Our 
psychological definition does not require that altruistic acts pertain to survival or impose a cost 
to agents. 
We use the term prosocial behavior for acts that tend to promote the welfare of others, 
regardless of the motive underlying these acts (for a discussion of different types of prosocial 
behaviors, see Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, 2013). Since prosocial acts are defined at the level of 
behaviors rather than motives, prosocial behaviors do not always stem from altruistic motives. 
For instance, some have argued that infants help others to engage in social interactions, not to 
promote the well-being of others (Carpendale, Hammond, & Atwood, 2013; Dahl, 2015; Paulus, 
2014). 
 We distinguish two types of altruistic acts that appear to emerge at different 
developmental stages. The first type of altruistic acts to emerge are those motivated by empathic 
  
 
 
concerns for others’ welfare but not yet accompanied by evaluations of helping as good or 
required. Indeed, some have proposed that empathy is a central motivator of altruistic behavior 
(e.g., de Waal, 2008). However, humans also engage in a second type of altruistic acts—those 
accompanied by normative evaluations of helping as good or required (Dahl et al., 2018; Miller 
et al., 1990; Turiel, 2015). Altruistic acts accompanied by perceived obligations or other 
evaluations set human altruism apart from helpful behaviors in other animals. The human 
conceptions of normativity and obligation are unique because no other animals appear to possess 
the kinds of third-party categorical evaluations seen in humans (von Rohr et al., 2012). These 
human concerns with the well-being of others are central to coexistence in societies. 
 Furthermore, we propose that infants help before they are motivated by concerns for 
others’ welfare or make normative evaluations. We refer to these first types of helping as 
prealtruistic helping. In recent research, infants helped others from around their first birthday 
(Warneken & Tomasello, 2007). We consider these early helpful actions prealtruistic for several 
reasons: Infants’ instrumental helpful actions do not usually co-occur, or correlate, with 
responsiveness to another person’s distress (Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, 2013; Paulus, 2018). Infants 
do not appear to view themselves as obligated to help in standard helping experiments: One-
year-olds often play instead of helping an experimenter, even in simple helping tasks (Waugh & 
Brownell, 2017). Infant helping often has a gamelike character, suggesting that infants might 
engage in these behaviors because they like to interact with others (Carpendale et al., 2013; Dahl, 
2015; Paulus, 2014). In short, infants’ earliest acts of helping differ in important ways from 
altruistic tendencies in older children and adults. 
 
The Gradual Development of Human Altruism: A Framework for Research 
  
 
 
 We propose that the development of human altruism involves four phases that form a 
developmental sequence, spanning from infancy to preschool age. As noted, we designate the 
first two phases prealtruistic since they constitute building blocks for developed altruism but do 
not yet involve concerns with others’ welfare. The four phases are 1) social preference for 
interacting with others (prealtruistic), 2) preference for action fulfillment (prealtruistic), 3) 
concern with promoting others’ well-being (altruistic), and 4) norm-based concerns (altruistic). 
 
1) Social Preference for Interacting with Others (Prealtruistic) 
From early in life, infants are oriented toward and interact with others (Brownell, 2011). 
From birth, infants depend on caregivers, providing numerous opportunities to receive help and 
comfort from others. During the first year, infants increasingly derive pleasure from social 
interactions, smiling and laughing during interactions as well as trying to engage others 
(Messinger & Fogel, 2007). The exchange of positive emotions in dyadic interactions forms the 
basis of the subsequent development of triadic interactions, that is, infants’ and caregivers’ joint 
action on objects (Brownell, 2011; Moore, 2006). 
Infants begin partcipating in self-care activities in the first year, for instance, by holding 
their own toothbrush (Hammond, Al-Jbouri, Edwards, & Feltham, 2017). These earliest acts of 
helping likely build on skills acquired through earlier triadic interactions. In the transition from 
the first to the second year, children also increasingly understand others’ communicative cues 
(Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998). Thus, by the end of the first year, children are 
motivated to interact with others, can use others’ communicative signals regarding objects, and 
can act jointly on objects with others. These abilities are crucial components of the next phase in 
the development of altruism. 
  
 
 
Infants’ interest in joint activities may explain their engagement in simple instrumental 
helping activities (Dahl, 2015; Paulus, 2014). For example, most young infants reliably pick up 
objects from the ground and hand them to another person (Warneken & Tomasello, 2007). 
Similarly, young infants hand over objects when adults stretch out their hand to signal a request 
(often described as sharing). The act of handing an object to someone is similar to the give-and-
take games parents and young infants commonly play. In these games, infants return an object to 
their play partner, who in turn releases the object or brings it close to the child. Consistent with 
the notion that early helping behaviors are gamelike, some scholars have noted that infants enjoy 
participating in chores and do so at little or no cost to themselves (Rheingold, 1982). 
Thus, for most of the first year, infants’ helping behaviors are limited to simple acts that 
resemble other social games. The next phase—in which infants help others with more complex 
goals separable from the child’s involvement in the activity—seems to begin around or after the 
first birthday. 
 
2) Preferences for Action Fulfillment (Prealtruistic) 
 In the first half of the second year, infants’ helping behavior increasingly encompasses 
actions that promote more complex goals. For instance, at 18 months, but rarely at 14 months, 
infants can open a cabinet that allows an adult to put items inside or place a dropped book on top 
of a stack of books an experimenter is trying to build (Warneken & Tomasello, 2007). Similarly, 
in more complex sharing contexts, young children start to help others obtain a resource they were 
striving for even when not directly requested (Paulus, 2014). These situations go beyond 
reciprocal exchange as children help adults achieve a behavioral action goal without receiving an 
object. Thus, over the second year, children demonstrate an inclination to fulfill others’ goals, or 
  
 
 
help others complete an action. 
 The development of these helpful tendencies is likely supported by young children’s 
growing social understanding (Carpendale & Lewis, 2004). Indeed, toddlers develop a more 
sophisticated understanding of others’ actions that helps them deal with more complex 
interactions. On a theoretical level, some scholars have argued that toddlers can use their 
emerging representational capacities to imagine others’ psychological states (Barresi & Moore, 
1996; Moore, 2006). This capacity seems relevant when dealing with unfulfilled action goals. 
Some scholars have also suggested that goal contagion—when infants are unconsciously 
“infected” with the other person’s goal—plays a role in these forms of helping behavior 
(Kenward & Gredebäck, 2013; Paulus, 2014). 
Representing and promoting others’ goals does not imply a concern with others’ welfare. 
In some situations, what a person wants is contrary to the promotion of their welfare, for 
instance, when they want to ingest something that is bad for them (Martin & Olson, 2013). 
Indeed, some evidence suggests that helpful actions early in the second year are based on 
concerns with others’ instrumental goals rather than their welfare. Infants rarely seek to relieve 
others’ distress early in the second year (Roth-Hanania et al., 2011; Zahn-Waxler, Radke-
Yarrow, Wagner, & Chapman, 1992). Further supporting the claim that infants help without 
concern for the recipient’s welfare, infants also behave helpfully toward inanimate agents 
(Kenward & Gredebäck, 2013). Finally, 1-½-year-olds did not help more when an experimenter 
expressed sadness than when she expressed neutral affect (Newton, Goodman, & Thompson, 
2014). However, young children gradually become more prone to relieve the distress of another 
person, as we discuss next. 
 
  
 
 
3) Empathic Concern with Others’ Well-Being (Altruistic) 
 By late in the second year, most children show empathic concern with relieving others’ 
distress (Campbell, Leezenbaum, Schmidt, Day, & Brownell, 2015; Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992). 
At this age, children often go beyond facial expressions of concern or interest and act to alleviate 
the other’s distress, for instance, by giving a hug or alerting a third party (Paulus, Jung, 
O’Driscoll, & Moore, 2017; Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992). Late in the second year, children also 
appear to want to see others be helped, even if they do not provide the help themselves (Hepach, 
Vaish, & Tomasello, 2012; but for alternative explanations, see Pletti, Scheel, & Paulus, 2017). 
Helping promote someone’s welfare differs conceptually from fulfilling action goals because it 
requires being attuned to the another person’s emotional state, not just to the person’s immediate, 
practical goal. 
 The ontogeny of empathic helping could be based on perception-action links between 
others’ expressions of emotions that could trigger an equivalent emotional state in the observer 
(de Waal, 2008). Yet to get beyond simple emotional contagion, children need to attribute their 
negative state to the other person, that is, to understand that the other person’s negative state is 
the cause of their own sorrow. Some scholars have argued that this involves transitions in self-
awareness and the acquisition of self-concept that emerge in the second and third years of life 
(Moore, 2006; Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992). 
Empathic responsiveness to others’ emotional states does not require obligations or 
evaluations. That is, children and adults may respond empathically toward someone without 
thinking they are obligated to help or without reflecting on whether it is good to help. Indeed, in 
a study of 6-year-olds, empathic responsiveness and evaluative reasoning predicted helpful 
behaviors separately (Malti, Gummerum, Keller, & Buchmann, 2009). Hence, to develop 
  
 
 
altruism in the sense defined earlier, children must develop a normative stance toward helpful 
actions. 
 
4) A Normative Stance Toward Altruistic Actions (Altruistic) 
 The last phase in the development of altruism involves developing a normative stance 
toward altruistic actions. That is, beyond merely engaging in altruistic actions, for instance, by 
fulfilling others’ the goals or alleviating their distress, children begin to reflect on whether one is 
obligated to help and, potentially, in which situations helping might be prohibited (e.g., not 
helping a robber is good). Normative evaluations differ from mere preferences in that they are 
agent-neutral—that is, they apply whether an individual is an agent, a recipient, or an observer. 
These evaluations may be informed by more general moral principles regarding the protection of 
others’ welfare (Dahl et al., 2018; Turiel, 2015). 
The importance of distinguishing empathy-based altruistic acts from an obligatory stance 
toward altruism is a central but often overlooked aspect in research on developing altruism (for 
similar arguments, see Turiel, 2015). Theoretical debates have highlighted that empathy alone is 
insufficient for fully developed altruism and can even conflict with moral principles (Decety & 
Cowell, 2014). This demonstrates that humans can transcend the level of merely engaging in 
empathy-driven behavior by taking a normative stance toward its moral value; it also suggests 
that scholars need to consider this point as part of a comprehensive framework on the nature of 
human altruism. 
Research on young children’s evaluations of helping acts is limited. Studies have 
demonstrated that children can judge and reason about helping behaviors by ages 7 to 8 years 
(Kahn, 1992; Miller et al., 1990). However, studies on other social actions (e.g., harming, 
  
 
 
stealing) suggest that children can judge and reason about social actions by ages 3 or 4 years 
(Dahl & Kim, 2014; Nucci & Weber, 1995). A recent study suggested that judgments about 
helping also develop around this age (Van de Vondervoort & Hamlin, 2017). When presented 
with a helpful and a hindering puppet, 4- and 5-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, tended to say that 
the helpful puppet was nicer and more likeable than the hindering puppet. Although the study 
involved forced choice between the helper and hinderer puppet, and not separate evaluations of 
the helper, it suggests that normative evaluations of helping develop in the preschool years. 
How children begin to evaluate others‘ actions normatively around age 3 is not well 
understood. Some have proposed that normative evaluations are constructed from joint 
commitments to social interactions (Carpendale et al., 2013). A related approach has stressed that 
children construct moral and other evaluative concepts from direct social experiences involving 
acts of helping and harming (Turiel, 2015). According to the latter proposal, these social 
experiences lead children to distinguish moral issues of welfare and rights from conventional 
issues regarding authorities and rules, as well as from other evaluative considerations (Dahl & 
Kim, 2014; Nucci & Weber, 1995). 
Evaluative considerations continue to develop during and beyond the preschool period. 
For instance, 5- and 6-year-olds use more normative terms than 3-year-olds and are more likely 
than 3- and 4-year-olds to enforce fairness norms regarding others (Wörle & Paulus, 2018). 
Moreover, the importance of being a good person becomes an integral aspect of children’s self-
concept (i.e. moral identity; Paulus, 2018). At ages 7 and beyond, children incorporate 
increasingly complex considerations when evaluating helping, taking into account the 
relationship between the helper and the recipient as well as the permissibility of the recipient’s 
goal (Killen & Turiel, 1998; Miller et al., 1990). Each of these changes within the moral domain 
  
 
 
build on the ability to evaluate prosocial and other behaviors in normative terms. 
 
Conclusion and Outlook 
 In this article, we defined human altruism as actions based on concerns with others’ 
welfare. We also noted that, in its fully developed form, altruism involves the ability to evaluate 
acts that promote the welfare of others, for instance, viewing some helpful acts as obligatory. We 
proposed that altruism emerges gradually through four phases during early childhood. In the first 
year, infants show an interest in interacting with others. Next, infants develop a preference for 
goal completion. Later, children increasingly respond to others’ distress with actions aimed at 
remedying their suffering, for instance, by giving them a comforting object. This, we argued, is 
the earliest phenomenon that qualifies as altruism. Finally, children begin to take a normative 
stance toward helping behaviors, evaluating some helpful acts as good or obligatory and others 
as wrong. 
 This framework for studying the emergence of human altruism leads to several questions 
and hypotheses for research. One set of questions deals with how the phases are described. In 
addressing these questions, we need to consider whether they apply to all types of altruistic acts 
in the same way. For instance, do children view some empathic acts as obligatory around the 
same age as they view some instrumental helping acts as obligatory? Another set of questions 
pertains to processes of developmental change. How do children begin to act on their empathic 
concern for others’ distress? What initially leads children to evaluate helpful and unhelpful 
actions? A third set of questions pertains to developments beyond the preschool years, for 
instance, how and when do children view previously inaccessible forms of altruism (e.g.,saving a 
life) as morally required (Dahl et al., 2018)? 
  
 
 
 This developmental framework is useful both for framing research questions and for 
clarifying how findings are interpreted. If we use the phrase human altruism to refer to both 
infants’ acts of handing objects to others late in the first year and older children’s and adults’ 
efforts to save others’ lives, sometimes at great personal cost, we risk glossing over important 
developmental transitions. If older children and adults helped others only when they expected an 
enjoyable social interaction, as infants appear to do, human societies would look quite different 
than they do today.  
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